Strategies

I started this category to keep all the strategies on hand. Will cut and paste from other sections. These strategies ARE the game plans.

Feel free to add others! Just make sure you give credit where credit is due and provide the original link.

2010-2012 Yemen Country Strategy

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Strategic Focus for 2010-2012
USAID’s overarching strategic goal in Yemen is to increase Yemen’s stability through
targeted interventions in vulnerable1 areas. This goal implies a localized strategy with
development programming tailored to address the drivers of instability in specific areas of the
country and to respond directly to the articulated needs and frustrations of communities in the
neediest areas. During the 2010-2012 period, the collaboration between the United States and
Republic of Yemen will grow stronger. Joint development goals include improving the
livelihoods of citizens in disadvantaged communities and improving governance capacities to
mitigate drivers of instability. The development hypothesis of the USAID/Yemen Strategy
postulates that addressing the development needs of underserved communities is causally related
to improving political and social stability. The foundation of political opposition and extremist
ideologies is, to a great extent, based on people’s level of satisfaction with the services their
government provides and whether there are real opportunities. Through development assistance
tailored to communities’ defined needs, people can see their government responding and
improvements in their economic environment that open up opportunities to better their personal,
family and community situation. A higher level of satisfaction with the direction of their lives
will lower behaviors that create instability, such as extremism and violence. USAID’s assistance
is specifically designed to provide support in areas where the Government of Yemen (ROYG)
does not have the resources or expertise to execute, organize or manage such activities.

snip
Small-scale community
projects will address infrastructure, food security, agricultural productivity and other deficiencies
that limit economic prospects for targeted communities. Access to and quality of basic services
needs to be improved, especially in remote areas. USAID will build upon its existing health and
education programs to improve service access and quality in targeted communities. Small
infrastructure projects, such as health clinic and school rehabilitation will incorporate gendersensitive
access.

snip
USAID will work with communities to identify and fund low cost, high-impact, small-scale
infrastructure projects, including but not limited to rural electrification, water conservation
projects, tertiary canals and irrigation, road improvement, and bridge and street repair.
http://www.usaid.gov/locations/middle_east/documents/yemen/USAIDYemen2010-2012Strategy.pdf

Syria’s Assad pushes ‘Four Seas Strategy’

Syria, Iran’s Arab ally, is driving to build a grandiose new energy alliance across the Middle East and beyond aimed at thrusting the economically troubled state back into a regional leadership role.

President Bashar Assad calls his vision the Four Seas Strategy to link the Mediterranean, the Caspian Sea, the Black Sea and the Persian Gulf into an energy network.

This eastward-looking strategy is intersecting with China’s push westward in quest of oil, natural gas, raw materials and markets and converges on the Caspian, a major energy-producing zone.

The region, which lies between Iran and Russia, holds the world’s largest reservoir for oil and natural gas outside the Persian Gulf and Russia.

“The interplay of China’s growing footprint in the Caspian region via its modern Silk Road — reinforced by Syrian President Assad’s nascent ‘Four Seas Strategy’ — will have important implications for the United States, the European Union and other allies,” Lin wrote in a survey for the Jamestown Foundation, a Washington think tank.

China has been stepping up efforts to build strategic energy links with the Middle East, particularly Saudi Arabia, as U.S. influence in the region wanes.

snip
Chinese moves into the Caspian zone are “part of China’s overall Silk Road strategy to diversify energy dependence on the unstable Gulf region” — just as the Americans are doing — “and build overland routes to hedge against maritime supply disruptions from the gulf,” Lin wrote.

Assad’s ambitious strategy, which he unveiled in 2009, hinges heavily on Syria’s mushrooming relations with neighboring Turkey.

A decade ago the two countries were on the brink of war. Now, in a constantly changing geopolitical landscape, they are firm allies.

“At the center of Assad’s strategy is Syria’s economic relationship with Turkey and connecting the nation’s oil and gas infrastructure to the region’s expanding energy pipeline networks.”

To get the ball rolling, Ankara and Damascus plan to integrate their gas grids and link them with the Arab Gas Pipeline that starts in Egypt and serves Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Turkey.

Plans to build a new AGP link between Syria and Turkey were signed in 2009, with completion expected this year.

“Assad’s enlarged vision of Syria’s role as a strategic energy transiting role is to link the nation’s oil and gas pipeline network to the Nabucco pipeline that will carry oil from the Caspian Sea to Turkey and on to Europe,” Brooks observed.

Assad signed a free trade agreement with Turkey in 2007 and trade is expected to hit $5 billion a year by 2012. He has also signed agreements with Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Assad has also revived negotiations with Syria’s eastern neighbor, Iraq, which is driving to challenge Saudi Arabia as the top oil producer, to reopen an oil pipeline running from Kirkuk to Syria’s Mediterranean port of Banias.

http://www.upi.com/Science_News/Resource-Wars/2011/01/06/Syrias-Assad-pushes-Four-Seas-Strategy/UPI-98471294335880/

huge…it’s always a “Strategy”

38 North U.S.-Korea Institute at SAIS

38 North is a website devoted to analysis of North Korea. While it strives to break new ground, the site’s main objective is to bring the best possible analysis to all those who work on North Korea for a living and those who are just interested in what happens there. Too often analysis of the North is permeated by inexperience, littered with inaccurate information or grounded in just plain bad deductive reasoning. We believe no one really knows for sure what is going on in North Korea but we can at least try to understand the possibilities. And anyone who professes certainty should be viewed with the greatest skepticism.

To accomplish these objectives, 38 North will harness the experience of long-time observers of North Korea and others who have dealt directly with North Koreans. It will also draw on other experts outside the field who might bring fresh, well-informed insights to those of us who follow North Korea.

38 North will not just cover North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction but will also dig beneath the surface of political, economic, social and other developments. And of course, as recent events have shown, from Kim Jong Il’s stroke to the currency revaluation to the opening of fast food restaurants in Pyongyang, there is a lot happening. North Korea is not a hermit kingdom, but rather a country that has been in the throes of change, good and bad, for over a decade. Those changes have important implications for the Korean peninsula, the East Asian region and the international community.
http://38north.org/about/

Partners
U.S.-Korea Institute at SAIS
Chatham House
Weatherhead East Asian Institute
The Nautilus Institute
East Asia Institute
University of Cambridge
The East-West Center in Washington
Institute of Oriental Studies
Johns Hopkins University
The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS)
University of Vienna
CanKor

38 North is a program of the U.S.-Korea Institute at SAIS (USKI), managed by Joel S. Wit, former U.S. State Department official and current USKI Visiting Scholar, and Jenny Town, USKI Research Associate.

NOTE
Joel Wit is the author of U.S. STRATEGY TOWARDS NORTH KOREA:
Rebuilding Dialogue and Engagement

U.S. STRATEGY TOWARDS NORTH KOREA:
Rebuilding Dialogue and Engagement

A report by the U.S.-Korea Institute at SAIS and the Weatherhead East Asian Institute at Columbia University
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
JOEL S. WIT is a visiting fellow at the U.S.-Korea Institute at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University and an adjunct senior research fellow at the Weatherhead East Asia Institute at Columbia University. snip
After leaving the State Department, he was as visiting scholar at the Brookings Institution from 2000 to 2002 and subsequently senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) until 2005. Wit is the co-author of Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis.

snip
A NEW U.S. STRATEGY

snip (page 41)
Humanitarian/Development Cooperation:Such programs can help address (although not solve) critical problems, such as chronic food shortages and public health needs. Initial humanitarian assistance efforts can lay the groundwork for sustained rehabilitation and donor interventions and prepare the frame-work for establishing pilot food security programs. Those programs will build patterns of cooperation critical for long-term “sustain-able development” projects.

Economic Engagement: Nurturing market change can help put North Korea’s economy on a sustainable long-term footing that will benefit its people. It will encourage an out-ward- oriented growth strategy that will gradually integrate North Korea into a dynamic regional economy and international financial system. This process will require:
1) capacity- and institution-building necessary to enable Pyongyang to manage its own financial affairs in line with international norms for transpar-ency and rule-based practices;
2) encouraging the expansion of markets and decentralized decision-making by enterprises, collective farms, households and local governments; and
3) ensuring that aid has meaningful economic rationality compatible with the transforma-tive agenda. Such assistance could bump up against the North’s negative attitudes towards reform and efforts to manage gradual changes currently underway.

Energy Cooperation: Despite the need for extensive assistance to rehabilitate the North’s energy infrastructure, packages should at least initially avoid large-scale projects, and in-stead include a suite of smaller, incremental programs better able to address pressing prob-lems. These problems include: implementing energy efficiency measures, rehabilitating the rural energy infrastructure and power plants, and beginning a transition to more gas use to improve overall energy-efficiency, reduce local environmental impacts, and prepare for re-gional gas grid integration. Assistance can also open up new export opportunities, increase energy security and sustainability, offer environmental benefits, and advance capacity-building through the provision of training for North Koreans. Such programs would not only rebuild ties with the international community and encourage the peaceful evolution of the North, but also serve long-term interests, such as reintegrating Pyongyang into the regional energy system. Key hurdles to overcome will be the North’s limited absorptive capacity and the escalating costs of assistance.

snip
Washington will play a key role in many of these areas but should be open to other concerned governments and international organizations taking the lead in some as well. For example, the European states might advance a number of different capacity-building initiatives to assist the North in fashioning economic development programs. There is also ample room for non-governmental organizations, private foundations and even industry to conduct their own cooperative programs with the North or in partnership with others. For example, a recent private American initiative to combat a serious public health problem in the North has combined the resources of a well-known university, a privatefoundation and state and national medical authorities. An additional benefit from this approach will be to diversify contacts with a broad range of North Korean organizations at all levels of society,helping to further encourage positive change and laying the foundation for future cooperation.Finally, Washington should seek to magnify the attractiveness of its positive leverage by combining
http://www.columbia.edu/cu/weai/pdf/NKreportOCT09Wit.pdf

R, 84 pages of a very detailed plan. PDF, difficult for me to cut and paste…please take a look…SAIS, CSIS

SAIS http://uskoreainstitute.org/

H.R. 1152: Silk Road Strategy Act of 1999
To amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to target assistance to support the economic and political independence of the countries of the South Caucasus and Central Asia.

snip
It shall be the policy of the United States in the countries of the South Caucasus and Central Asia–

(1) to promote and strengthen independence, sovereignty, democratic government, and respect for human rights;

(2) to promote tolerance, pluralism, and understanding and counter racism and anti-Semitism;

(3) to assist actively in the resolution of regional conflicts and to facilitate the removal of impediments to cross-border commerce;

(4) to promote friendly relations and economic cooperation;

(5) to help promote market-oriented principles and practices;

(6) to assist in the development of the infrastructure necessary for communications, transportation, education, health, and energy and trade on an East-West axis in order to build strong international relations and commerce between those countries and the stable, democratic, and market-oriented countries of the Euro-Atlantic Community; and

(7) to support United States business interests and investments in the region
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h106-1152

Introduced Mar 17, 1999
Referred to Committee View Committee Assignments
Reported by Committee Jul 22, 1999
Passed House Aug 2, 1999
This bill never became law

March 1999
BROWNBACK SILK ROAD STRATEGY ACT PASSES SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE TODAY
The Silk Road Strategy Act of 1999 (S. 579) introduced by U.S. Sen. Sam Brownback, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, today passed by a bipartisan vote in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
http://brownback.senate.gov/pressapp/record.cfm?id=175949

In October 1997, Sen. Brownback
introduced a bill, the Silk Road Strategy Act of 1997 (S. 1344) that provides incentives
for the Central Asian states to cooperate with each other and with the United States, rather
than with Iran. The bill was reported to the full Senate on June 23, 1998.
http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/702.pdf

Excellent Heritage.org paper from 1998
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/1998/09/ethnic-interests-threaten-us-interests-in-the-caucus

Another attempt in 2006

S. 2749: Silk Road Strategy Act of 2006
109th CongressThis is a bill in the U.S. Congress originating in the Senate (“S.”). A bill must be passed by both the Senate and House and then be signed by the President before it becomes law.

Bill text (more comprehensive than 1999) worth a look!
To update the Silk Road Strategy Act of 1999 to modify targeting of assistance in order to support the economic and political independence of the countries of Central Asia and the South Caucasus in recognition of political and economic changes in these regions since enactment of the original legislation.
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=s109-2749

SponsonrSen. Samuel Brownback [R-KS]cosponsors (2)
Cosponsors:
Kay Hutchison [R-TX]
Jon Kyl [R-AZ]

Status: Introduced May 4, 2006
This bill never became law

“The Key to Success in Afghanistan: A Modern Silk Road Strategy.” http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/silkroadpapers/1005Afghan.pdf

article
Afghanistan’s future lies in trade partnerships
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/18/AR2010061803761.html

Forging a Strategic U.S.-EU Partnership

http://transatlantic.sais-jhu.edu/bin/c/s/us-eu_report_final.pdf

US millionaire Wadhwani sets up India chair at CSIS


Multimillionaire Silicon Valley information technology entrepreneur Romesh Wadhwani, CEO of Symphony Technology Group in Palo Alto, California, has established an India Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies -- a leading Washington, DC think tank -- that will be occupied by Karl F Inderfurth, erstwhile Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs in the Clinton Administration.

The chair, called the Wadhwani Chair in US-India Policy Studies -- which will be funded by the Wadhwani Foundation, founded by Wadhwani and his wife Kathleen Wadhwani--will replace the South Asia Program at CSIS, which was headed since its inception in 1998 by former veteran diplomat Teresita Schaffer, who has left CSIS to do some independent consulting.

snip
Echoing Nunn's sentiments, John Hamre, CSIS president and CEO, said, "The US-India relationship is one of America's most strategically important partnerships of the 21st century," and predicted, "Dr Wadhwani's generosity, and Karl Inderfurth's work as the Wadhwani Chair, will contribute to critical policymaking efforts to build a secure and sustainable future for the relationship."

snip
Wadhwani, whose Symphony Technology Group, is a group of nine software and service companies with combined revenue of over $2.5 billion and 15,000 employees, in providing his rationale for setting up the India Chair at CSIS, where he serves on the Board of Trustees, said, "The importance of the strategic partnership between the US and India and the changing dynamic in both countries requires us to take policy thought leadership to the next level."

"The Wadhwani Chair at CSIS is intended to be the fulcrum for this and to develop creative new options for top policy makers in both countries to accelerate economic development," he said, and added: "We are delighted to have a person with the stature of Karl Inderfurth as the first holder of the Wadhwani Chair."

The Wadhwani Foundation, is devoted to accelerating economic development in India and emerging economies and is currently leading and funding many ongoing ongoing large-scale economic development initiatives in India, including the National Entrepreneurship Network and the Opportunities Network for the Disabled.

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The CSIS said that the Wadhwani Chair would "serve as an independent platform in Washington from which to assess major policies and strategic issues in the relationship between India and the United States and place special emphasis on policies to accelerate economic development in India, with a wide-ranging agenda including economics, energy security, climate change, regional security and India's role in the world."
http://www.rediff.com/business/report/us-millionaire-wadhwani-sets-up-india-chair-at-csis/20110114.htm

HUGE HUGE HUGE..we should see a US INDIA strategy soon.
That being said. I started this category to keep all the strategies on hand. These strategies ARE the game plans.

Sudan Strategy
http://www.state.gov/p/af/ci/su/134582.htm

Sudan: A Critical Moment, A Comprehensive Approach

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U.S. Strategic Objectives


The U.S. strategy in Sudan must focus on ending the suffering in Darfur, and building a lasting peace. The three principal U.S. strategic priorities in Sudan include:


1) A definitive end to conflict, gross human rights abuses, and genocide in Darfur.

2) Implementation of the North-South CPA that results in a peaceful post-2011 Sudan, or an orderly path toward two separate and viable states at peace with each other.

3) Ensure that Sudan does not provide a safe haven for international terrorists.

snip
Strategic Objective II: Implementation of the CPA that results in a peaceful post-2011 Sudan or an orderly transition to two separate and viable states at peace with each other.

snip
Promote Improved Governing Capacity and Greater Transparency in Southern Sudan. The United States will work to improve security for the southern Sudanese people by supporting DDR and conflict prevention initiatives and strengthening the capacity of the security sector and criminal justice system. The United States will also work to improve economic conditions and outcomes. The United States will provide technical advisors to vital ministries and will work to strengthen entities such as the U.N. Development Program’s Local Government Reform Program (LGRP). The United States will work with international partners to implement the World Bank Multi-Donor Trust Fund South Strategy in a timely manner and to improve access to capital, particularly microfinancing, for agricultural enterprises and local private sector ventures. The United States will support efforts and initiatives that assist in increasing trade between Sudan and its neighbors. Transparency in fiscal expenditures will be critical to attracting investment, and the United States will support World Bank anticorruption efforts in Southern Sudan.
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/oct/130672.htm

sounds familiar. Interesting that the "New Sudan Strategy" is from 2009 and the whole election just took place...they were pretty confident about the outcome.

Obama unveils new Sudan strategy
Mon Oct 19, 2009
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN1936988220091019

STRATEGIC PLAN
Fiscal Years 2007-2012

he Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) are pleased to provide this joint Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years
2007 to 2012 that sets forth the Secretary of State’s direction and priorities
for both organizations in the coming years.

The joint Strategic Plan supports the policy positions set forth by President Bush in the
National Security Strategy and presents how the Department and USAID will implement
U.S. foreign policy and development assistance.

In the joint Strategic Plan, the Strategic Goal section defines the primary aims of U.S. foreign
policy and development assistance as well as our strategic priorities within each of those
goals for the coming years. In addition, for each goal we identify key U.S. Government
partners and external factors that could affect achievement of these goals. The Regional
Priority section describes the Department and USAID priorities within each region of the
world. The joint Strategic Goals cut across the regional priority chapters. The regional
priorities reflect how the efforts described in the Strategic Goal chapters fit together in
addressing specific regional issues.

The seven Strategic Goals outlined in this joint Strategic Plan constitute the strategic
planning framework for both agencies. This framework, and the Foreign Assistance Strategic
Framework with which it is consistent, will serve as the basis for both organizations’ annual
performance plans at the Department, bureau, and mission levels. The annual plans will
focus more specifically on our efforts to meet tangible performance goals and will contain
specific performance indicators. Our success in meeting our performance goals will indicate
our overall progress in achieving the mission and strategic goals outlined in this joint
Strategic Plan.

This joint Strategic Plan is submitted in accordance with the Government Performance and
Results Act of 1993 (GPRA).

Department of State/USAID Joint Strategic Goal Framework
Strategic Goal 1: Achieving Peace and Security
Counterterrorism
Weapons of mass destruction and destabilizing
conventional weapons
Security cooperation and security sector reform
Conflict prevention, mitigation, and response
Transnational crime
Homeland security

Strategic Goal 2: Governing Justly and Democratically
Rule of law and human rights
Good governance
Political competition and consensus building
Civil society

Strategic Goal 3: Investing in People
Health
Education
Social services and protection for especially vulnerable
populations

Strategic Goal 4: Promoting Economic Growth and Prosperity
Private markets
Trade and investment
Energy security
Environment
Agriculture

Strategic Goal 5: Providing Humanitarian Assistance
Protection, assistance, and solutions
Disaster prevention and mitigation
Orderly and humane means for migration management

Strategic Goal 6: Promoting International Understanding
Offer a positive vision
Marginalize extremism
Nurture common interests and values

Strategic Goal 7: Strengthening Consular and Management Capabilities
Consular services (Visas, Passports, American
Citizen Services)

Snip
Africa
Regional Priorities
Sudan/Darfur:
Our top priority is Sudan, where we seek to secure peace and democracy countrywide and support the Sudanese people to implement the North/South Comprehensive Peace Agreement. In Darfur, U.S. humanitarian assistance
helps meet basic needs and provides protection to vulnerable people. We will continue to support accountability for
serious violations of human rights. We will also continue to facilitate dialogue among the contending parties, negotiate
the introduction of a credible, effective peacekeeping force leading to a sustainable peace, and encourage economic
growth. (Strategic Goal Linkages: 1, 3, 5, and others)

Liberia, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Post-Conflict Countries: We will support post-conflict
reconstruction in countries such as Liberia, where Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf was elected Africa’s first female president, and
DRC, which recently successfully held its first free election since 1960. There and elsewhere, our humanitarian assistance
will speed recovery from conflict and disaster, facilitate the return of refugees, and support peace and economic growth.
To promote stability across Africa, we will strengthen bilateral relations with key sub-regional states, such as South Africa,
Nigeria, and Kenya. (Strategic Goal Linkages: 2, 4, 5, and others)
Major management functions

East Asia and Pacific
Regional Priorities
Promoting Peace and Security:
Our foremost regional priority is to protect our vital interests: stability, security, and
peace. We will seek to sustain partnerships with our treaty allies—Australia, Japan, Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand.
Through strengthened multilateral cooperation with our partners, we seek to end verifiably North Korea’s nuclear and
missile programs and fully implement UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1718. We will expand dialogue with
China, encouraging it to act as a responsible stakeholder in the international system and encouraging dialogue between
Beijing and the elected leaders in Taipei. We will support increasing economic and social integration across the Taiwan
Strait while upholding our commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act. We will work to promote stability in the Pacific
island states. Indonesia, the world’s most populous Muslim-majority nation, and the Philippines, a treaty ally and the
region’s oldest democracy, are flagships of our transformational diplomacy efforts. We will build on successful
counterterrorism and nonproliferation programs and seek to enhance our maritime security cooperation with the littoral
countries in East Asia. (Strategic Goal Linkages: 1, 2, and 4)

Europe and Eurasia
U.S. Priorities beyond Europe:
Our top priority is to realize the President’s and the Secretary’s transformational goals
beyond Europe. In Western and Central Europe, about 75 percent of our work focuses on engaging allies to support U.S. priorities beyond Europe. Thus, Europe, including NATO, OSCE, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), and the EU agenda, is a platform for global transformational diplomacy. For example, our work on
Iran would be impossible without Europe. European partners are critical to sustaining our work in Iraq and Afghanistan,as those countries account for 80 percent of non-U.S. coalition forces and are taking a lead in military operations in the south of Afghanistan through NATO. The EU and its member states have provided billions of dollars in reconstruction support to Afghanistan and Iraq, and NATO has expanded its work to new areas like Darfur. Europeans are also strong partners in dealing with Israel-Palestine and the broader Middle East, North Korea, Somalia, Haiti, Burma, Venezuela, and Colombia. (Strategic Goal Linkages: 1, 2, and others)

Near East
Regional Priorities
Iraq: Our foremost policy priority is to help the Iraqi people build a democratic, stable, and prosperous Iraq. To that end, we will continue to support all parties in their attempt to work towards a resolution of the outstanding issues, and to provide a secure environment for our overall objectives. The United States will continue to play a prominent role in
helping the Iraqi people in economic and political reconstruction. We also will continue to work with the Iraqi military
and police to ensure that a capable security force is prepared to assume control over all of Iraq. (Strategic Goal Linkages:
1, 2, 3, and others)

Iran: The single largest long-term threat to regional stability and peace is Iran. We remain committed to preventing Iran from realizing a nuclear program that threatens its neighbors and the world. We continue to work with our allies in
pressuring Iran to suspend fully its nuclear enrichment and reprocessing program and cooperate with the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the UN Security Council, to cease its support for extremist groups throughout the
region, and to work with those inside and outside of Iran seeking a more democratic future. In the years ahead, we
anticipate increased needs for broadcasting, cultural and educational exchanges, and democracy programming in Iran.
(Strategic Goal Linkages: 1, 2, and 6)

Arab-Israeli Conflict: A peaceful, negotiated solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict remains a top U.S. priority. To that end,
we will continue to: support the humanitarian needs of the Palestinian people; encourage popular support for moderate,
democratic, pro-peace Palestinian leadership; and encourage broad regional support for peace with Israel. (Strategic
Goal Linkages: 1, 2, 5, and others)

South and Central Asia
Afghanistan: In Afghanistan, the U.S. Government, with the enhanced support of NATO, will work to bring stability by enhancing the effectiveness and reach of the elected government. This will require extensive capacity building in the Afghan Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior. A capable Afghan National Army will provide increased security, and a trained and well-equipped Afghan National Police will fairly enforce the country’s laws, thus earning the confidence of the Afghan people.
Working with the Government of Afghanistan and international partners, the U.S. Government will combat opium
production and trafficking. This will entail eradicating poppy fields and prosecuting and jailing traffickers and those
promoting the illicit drug economy. To ensure that rural incomes remain adequate without opium, the U.S. Government
will promote alternative income sources, such as high value horticulture and rural small enterprises, and promote
economic growth. (Strategic Goal Linkages: 1, 2, 3, and others)

Pakistan/Afghanistan Border Region: The Pakistan/Afghanistan border is a terrorist haven. To combat this, the U.S. Government supports the Pakistani President’s strategy for economic and social development in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas—the first concerted effort to extend central government control over this remote and traditionally
ungovernable region. Increased economic development and access to education, health and other government services should more fully integrate these areas. The U.S. Government also will promote Regional Opportunity Zones in this area.
(Strategic Goal Linkages: 1, 2, 4, and others)
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/86291.pdf

READ IT!...If there was any doubt that our future is planned, this will reaffirm our claims. TPTB have to hate the internet!

i will take a look at that!

Afghanistan Beyond the
Fog of Nation Building:
Giving Economic
Strategy a Chance

SILK ROAD PAPER
January 2011
S. Frederick Starr


http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/silkroadpapers/1101Afghanistan-Starr.pdf


CENTCOM Getting On the "New Silk Road"


S. Frederick Starr, the head of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute in Washington and one of the more tireless proponents of this idea, has released a new report (pdf) on the subject, and reports that CENTCOM and the State Department are coordinating a plan:

Over the previous year the “Afghan Futures Working Group” at the U.S. Army’s Central Command (Centcom) in Tampa had been analyzing all the several dozen road and transport projects that the U.S. government had undertaken since 2002. This “mapping and gapping” exercise had as its goal to identify what had been accomplished and what remained to be done, in order of priority. To the surprise of no one, the Working Group found a disorganized series of projects lacking general leadership and coordination. The findings of this study, prepared under General James N. Mattis, Centcom’s energetic Commander, have now been shared with the State Department, which will present them at ministry-level trilateral meetings between Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the United States on February 22-24.

U.S. European Command (EUCOM) also has been involved, holding its own conference in November 2010:

At this conference Admiral [James] Stavridis, now head of the U.S. European Command, again affirmed the view that ”we will not deliver security in Afghanistan solely from the barrel of a gun,” and endorsed the Modern Silk Road strategy for being comprehensive in scope and “a combination of international, interagency and private/public [initiatives]…We in the military are there to support [the Afghans] as we execute this comprehensive approach. That's what we’re trying to accomplish with this Silk Road oncept.”

Starr plays down somewhat the role that the Northern Distribution Network (the U.S. military-run logistics route carrying military cargo from Europe to Afghanistan through Central Asia) itself would play, saying it should just be a "component":

Does NDN have a future beyond the current U.S. military “surge”? Probably not, but it could be reconfigured to become a channel for private commerce, a component of the web of transport corridors that will connect to and through Afghanistan.

But I wonder if, among the military, the NDN element of this strategy is getting more attention.

Characteristically, Starr is generous with the superlatives:

By toppling the Taliban regime in 2001–2, the U.S. accomplished what the collapse of the U.S.S.R. failed to do, namely, to open the old southern border of the Soviet Union to transport and trade via Afghanistan to Pakistan, India, and beyond. The subsequent establishment of a trade-friendly government in Kabul completed the process, opening further potential corridors through Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Iran to the Middle East, Turkey, and Europe. The impact of these epochal developments is bound to be felt in every part of Eurasia, from the Atlantic to the Pacific, but it will be centered on Afghanistan itself.

The reopening all these age-old transit routes across Afghanistan is the single greatest achievement of U.S. foreign policy in the new millennium.

snip
Later he calls the opening up of trade routes around Afghanistan "arguably the most transformative development taking place on the Eurasian land mass today."

http://www.eurasianet.org/node/62739

An updated Modern Silk road strategy...huge!

excellent work nik

Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and
the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa

snip page 9
Although U.S. forces have traditionally focused on “fighting and winning wars,” defense strategy
is now evolving to look at conflict prevention, or “Phase Zero,” addressing threats at their
inception through increased emphasis on theater security cooperation (TSC) and capacity
building of allies.11 The 2010 QDR and the Obama Administration’s FY2011 Defense Budget
Request emphasize the strategic importance the Administration places on security assistance,
stating:
U.S. security is inextricably tied to the effectiveness of our efforts to help partners and allies
build their own security capacity…. Although security assistance is not new, what has
fundamentally changed is the role that such assistance can play in providing security in
today’s environment. Threats to our security in the decades to come are more likely to
emanate from state weakness than from state strength. The future strategic landscape will
increasingly feature challenges in the ambiguous gray area that is neither fully war nor fully
peace. In such an environment, enabling our partners to respond to security challenges may
reduce risk to U.S. forces and extend security to areas we cannot reach alone.

snip
U.S. Strategic Interests in Africa

The Obama Administration’s first National Security Strategy, issued in 2010, stresses the need to
“embrace effective partnerships” on the continent, highlighting a number of priorities, including
“access to open markets, conflict prevention, global peacekeeping, counterterrorism, and the
protection of vital carbon sinks.” The most recent Quadrennial Defense Review asserts that the
United States’ efforts to address transnational challenges in the region “will hinge on partnering
with African states… to conduct capacity building and peacekeeping operations, prevent
extremism, and address humanitarian crises.”

Snip
Timeline

snip
2001
Terrorism threat. On September 24, 2001, President George W. Bush reported to Congress, “consistent with
the War Powers Resolution,” and “Senate Joint Resolution 23” that in response to terrorist attacks on the
World Trade Center and the Pentagon he had ordered the “deployment of various combat-equipped and
combat support forces to a number of foreign nations in the Central and Pacific Command areas of
operations.” The President noted in efforts to “prevent and deter terrorism” he might find it necessary to
order additional forces into these and other areas of the world.” He stated that he could not now predict
“the scope and duration of these deployments,” or the “actions necessary to counter the terrorist threat to
the United States.”

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34003.pdf

Another strategy....Lots of mention of the Horn of Africa, Tunisia etc